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Reducing energy demand has become a key mechanism for limiting climate change, 
but practical problems with large energy savings in a growing global economy and, 
importantly, in its lower-income parts remain. Using new energy-GDP data, we show 
that adopting the same near-term low-energy growth trajectory in all regions in IPCC 
scenarios limiting global warming to 1.5°C presents an unresolved policy challenge. 
We discuss this challenge of combining energy demand reductions with robust 
income growth for the 6.4 billion people in middle and low income countries in light of 
economic development’s reliance on industrialisation. Our results highlight the 
importance of addressing limits to energy demand reduction in integrated 
assessment modelling when regional economic development is powered by 
industrialization and instead exploring faster energy supply decarbonization. Insights 
from development economics and other disciplines could help generate plausible 
assumptions given the financial, investment and stability issues involved. 
 
Limiting global warming to 2°C or even 1.5°C requires carbon emissions from energy to 
reach net zero by around mid-century1. Reducing energy demand is considered a key 
mechanism for emissions reduction and alleviates the burden on the two other principal 
measures: decarbonisation of the energy supply, and carbon dioxide removal (CDR)2. 
However, energy is key for the economy. The implications for global and regional economic 
growth of reducing energy demand are insufficiently explored but central in integrated 
assessment models (IAMs). 
 
Scenarios from IAMs synthesized in the IPCC Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5°C 
imply that absolute decoupling (i.e. reducing energy consumption while growing GDP) is 
both readily feasible and inexpensive3. The report presents 90 scenarios limiting the 
temperature increase to 1.5°C by 2100. In the near term, all continue or exceed historically 
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observed GDP growth rates. However, the scenarios assume declining primary energy (PE) 
demand in contrast to historical patterns, with median global PE demand falling by 13.6% 
between 2020 and 2030 to a rate of 507.5EJ/yr or 16.1TW, below the level of 2010. Some of 
this reduction is achieved by shifting from fossil to more efficient renewable energy sources. 
The resulting decarbonisation would be insufficient for meeting the 1.5°C constraint, so 
scenarios also require final energy (FE) demand to fall by a median 8.0% over the same 
period. Once decarbonisation is sufficiently advanced and/or CDR technologies become 
cost-competitive after 2040, energy demand is projected to return to its historical growth 
trend. These patterns are less pronounced, but qualitatively similar, in scenarios limiting 
temperature rise to 2°C. 
 
How plausible are these near-term projections? Economic growth-energy trajectories of rich, 
de-industrialising countries can be argued to decouple. But a large majority (84%) of the 
global population currently lives in low and middle income countries which are still set on a 
development path involving industrialisation. Using a new global dataset on national output-
energy relationships from 1950 to the present, we discuss why decoupling trends contained 
in the current scenarios is hard to justify for robustly growing developing countries and 
explore how the underlying models’ explanatory power could be improved. Focusing on the 
extreme case of the (relatively poor) Middle East and Africa region, we illustrate that 
scenario assumptions about decoupling, catching-up, and energy demand (e.g. that per 
capita FE demand is projected to fall, often below levels deemed critical for decent living 
standards, while income growth accelerates) imply a near-term mitigation capacity 
qualitatively similar to that of rich countries and a development path at odds with historical 
data and insights from development economics. While large efficiency improvements are 
thermodynamically possible, achieving the projected absolute decoupling alongside 
successful industrialisation presents an unresolved policy challenge. Growth strategies, 
financing of investments in capital constrained developing countries, means of technology 
transfer, and macroeconomic policy could facilitate both. Spelling them out explicitly could 
clarify lower limits on energy demand in growing economies and help uncover opportunities 
for modelling faster energy supply decarbonisation. 
 
Economic Activity and Energy Demand 
The dependence of economic output on energy can be expressed by decomposing output 
per capita (or labour productivity), Y/P, often seen as a measure of affluence, into energy 
per capita, E/P, and the inverse of energy intensity or energy ‘productivity’ of output in 
economists’ jargon, Y/E, 
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This is an economically-inspired decomposition4 related to the widely used Kaya identity.5 
Labour productivity growth requires either a decline in energy intensity (higher average 
energy productivity) or more energy per worker. Because energy enters the economy as 
primary energy (PE) and becomes final energy (FE) before acting directly on producing 
value as useful energy (UE), (1) can be further decomposed into 
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where first law conversion efficiencies from PE to FE, and on to useful energy, UE, 
determine how much PE input is needed for a given useful energy output. Exergy or second 
law efficiency imposes upper bounds on these conversion ratios and thus a lower bound on 
energy intensity at every level. 
 
In this sense, reducing energy demand is different from decarbonising its supply: there is no 
particular reason why the economy cannot run on a 100% decarbonised energy mix. 
However, thermodynamics explains why a minimum of energy must be involved in all 
productive human activity. Primary to final energy conversion efficiencies can be vastly 
improved when decarbonising the energy supply, and its magnitude is partly an accounting 
question.6 The pivot is the final to useful conversion efficiency, for which large theoretical 
and also significant technical potentials for improvement exist.7,8 The pertinent obstacles in a 
socio-economic context however are economic and behavioural, i.e. practical, limits to the 
rate at which efficiency improvements can be implemented in growing and developing 
economies, whose primary aim is to raise labour productivity and income per capita, not to 
improve energy efficiency. 
 
Historical trends 
The relationship between economic activity and energy demand has been widely analysed 
(see supplementary note 1). Historically, primary to final and useful conversion efficiencies 
have improved, but slowly. The useful energy to output ratio is stable without time trend9. 
Therefore, most labour productivity growth over the past three centuries translated into 
higher PE demand10–13. Since the Industrial Revolution humans unlock the energy stored in 
fossil fuels and power increasing amounts of useful labour human workers perform14,15. 
Labour productivity rose twentyfold between 1820 and the end of the millennium in Europe 
and its Western offshoots16. Most other countries have since embarked on the same process 
of energy-intensive technical change, aspiring to similar increases in labour productivity and 
the resulting standards of living. Economic historians mostly track correlations in GDP and 
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primary energy per capita15, although recent work tentatively confirms similar patterns for 
final and useful energy demand9,17,18. 
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
The relationship between energy use (PE/P) and labour productivity (Y/P) is clearly visible in 
our historical country-level dataset. Figure 1a depicts annual data for 186 countries over a 
period 1950-2014, comprising ~99% of global population in most years, on a log-log scale. It 
reveals a very tight correlation between GDP per capita (Y/P) and PE, with a Spearman rank 
correlation coefficient of 0.86 for the overall sample. While country-specific differences exist 
due to geography, climate, institutions, idiosyncratic production and consumption patterns 
etc., pooled data show that increases in GDP per capita go in hand with increases in PE per 
capita, both across countries and time. A flexible regression gives a nearly linear fit in the 
log-log plot over the interval relevant to today’s developing countries. The estimated GDP 
elasticity of primary energy, i.e. the logarithmic derivative of primary energy divided by that 
of GDP, is 0.89 over the interval of USD 2,000 to USD 20,000 in 2011 purchasing power 
parity (a country belongs to the high-income group from a GDP of around USD 12,500 per 
capita). In other words, a 10% increase in GDP/capita corresponds to a 8.9% increase in 
PE/capita (see Methods), with the remaining 1.1% capturing the gradual reductions of 
primary energy intensity, PE/GDP, over time19. The regression line flattens at very low levels 
suggesting a minimum level of energy use even when large parts of the economy operate in 
non-market subsistence activities or during (civil) war, e.g. the leftmost observations in the 
plot capture Liberia’s first civil war. Data points above USD 130,000 are small oil exporting 
countries, introducing strong idiosyncrasies to the regression at such income levels. Our 
findings are robust to relevant subsamples (e.g. only large economies, the G20, etc.) and to 
alternative measures of GDP and population (supplementary note 2). 
 
Globally, labour productivity and per capita energy measures have been growing over the 
complete sample, except for periods of crisis. Figure 1b divides global rates of change of 
GDP and PE/capita into three subperiods, corresponding to economic growth performance. 
The fastest global labour productivity growth on record occurred during 1950-73, known as 
the Golden Age of Capitalism (Gold)16. Rapid economic expansion was underpinned by an 
almost equally rapid growth in energy demand in particular for cheap oil and electricity; and 
rural electrification in many developing countries started virtually from scratch20,21. The 
Golden Age was followed by a period of crises and slow growth for the rest of the 20th 
century (Slow).16 Sluggish GDP growth during the 1973 and 1978-9 oil crises preceded the 
deepest recession in 1981 the world had seen since the Great Depression. 
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Deindustrialisation and productivity slowdown in rich countries combined with the transitions 
of formerly socialist economies, several of whom went through severe depressions, kept 
average growth rates lower throughout the 1980s-90s22. Higher energy prices and supply 
curtailment set in train energy demand restraint and efficiency-increasing technological 
change in rich countries. Meanwhile, the economic collapse of the Soviet Union forced a 
revision of its comparatively low efficiency energy sector and production processes23. 
China’s fast machinery upgrading combined with a shift towards light industry in the 1980s-
90s, temporarily slowed its energy demand growth relative to that of GDP24. These one-time 
shifts produced an almost stagnant PE/capita trajectory. After the millennium, growth in both 
measures rebounded, driven increasingly by China’s return to more energy intensive 
production, but also ‘emerging markets’ more generally. Fast growth in all indicators was 
interrupted by the Great Recession 2008-09. Growth rates subsequently returned to pre-
millennium levels. Overall, faster growth in one indicator was positively correlated with faster 
growth in the other, and PE demand growth was a good proxy also for that of FE (extended 
data figure 2). And while energy demand in rich countries has been stagnating and even 
falling, growth is continuing unchanged in middle and low income countries (figure 1c). 
 
Future Scenarios 
Stringent mitigation policy strives to break (some of) these historical trends. Scenarios of the 
IPCC special report calculate that in order to achieve the 1.5°C goal, a structural break from 
historical total energy-income relationships is needed in the coming twenty years. To 
characterize this break, figure 2a combines future projections of output and FE/capita with 
aggregated historical data from figure 1a. The historical trend (black in figure 2a) is upwards 
and rightwards. Extrapolations based on the three historical periods (red in figure 2a) 
continue in this direction: faster economic growth in the Gold and Millennium periods (further 
right) is associated with faster increases in energy demand (further up). Scenario pathways 
in contrast combine robust growth in per capita GDP with an unprecedented sustained 
reduction in FE/capita, particularly in the 2020s and 2030s. Similar results hold for PE and 
for scenarios limiting warming to 2°C (extended data figure 2).  
 
[Figure 2 about here] 
 
Four scenario pathways (blue in figure 2a), highlighted as so-called archetype scenarios in 
the IPCC special report, are based on the shared socioeconomic pathways (SSP) 1, 2, and 
5 and a ‘low energy demand’ (LED) scenario, which is also based on SSP2. Significant near 
term FE/capita reductions occur in all of them except SSP5, which assumes that current 
carbon-intensive development is adopted globally and projects GDP/capita growth faster 
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than seen even during the Golden Age. Since other mitigation avenues are assumed to be 
unavailable and/or exhausted, CDR is cost-effectively deployed to meet meaningful climate 
targets in SSP525. In SSP2 past technological, economic, and social dynamics are 
extrapolated and CDR is less costs-effective26. As a result, energy demand has to fall to 
meet the 1.5°C target, with rates of energy intensity reductions surpassing previous records 
set in the 1980s-90s. GDP/capita growth is robust, similar to the Millennium period average. 
The SSP1 “green growth” scenario is optimistic by design and, therefore, least consistent 
with historical trends, combining historically unobserved high GDP/capita growth rates with a 
17% reduction in FE/capita from 2020 to 203027. The LED is a Goldilocks scenario with the 
same baseline as SSP2, but with efficiency improvements and demand reductions due to 
consumer habits following best practice in both the global South and North28. FE/capita falls 
by 32% from 2020 to 2030. This ensemble of scenarios unmistakably illustrates the clean 
break with past energy drivers of economic growth underlying the 1.5°C and 2°C targets. 
 
This structural break extends to the regional level and is particularly striking for regions with 
lower labour productivity, represented by the Middle East and Africa (MAF) region in figure 
2b. In this region, median GDP growth per capita and year across scenarios runs at healthy 
2.5% during 2020-2050, compared with stagnating 0.1% during 1973-2000 and meagre 
1.4% during 2000-18. Since 1950, FE/capita has increased continuously in the MAF region, 
from less than 0.4kW/capita to around 1kW/capita. This is low compared to the global 
average of 1.75kW/capita and lower still in some African countries, as the MAF average 
masks the large variation between Middle Eastern oil exporters and sub-Saharan agrarian 
economies. However, rather than converging toward the world average and in spite of the 
evidence that, especially at these low levels, development (including GDP growth) and 
energy are particularly strongly coupled, almost all scenarios project steep declines in FE 
demand for the MAF region29. A majority of scenarios even move significantly below the 
0.95kW/cap (30GJ/yr/cap) FE identified as tantamount to low levels of development in the 
SSP literature itself30. The most extreme case sees a 56% reduction from 2020 to 2030 to a 
rate of below 0.5kW/cap (supplementary note 4 for detail). Similar patterns are projected in 
Asia and to a lesser extent Latin America (extended data figure 3). Put differently, the 
scenarios rely heavily on final to useful energy efficiency improvements to provide energy 
services for development. 
 
[Figure 3 about here] 
 
Mitigation strategies can also be characterized by comparing scenarios with their own 
baselines in addition to historical evidence.31 Figure 3a documents the near-term deviation 
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of both reference and policy scenarios’ growth rates from historical rates, by subtracting 
average growth rates for 1971-2015 that the IPCC report uses as its own validation period. 
Most global baselines (marked by asterisks) correlate faster GDP/capita growth with faster 
FE/capita growth than historically observed in the period to 2030. Remarkably, in the report 
short term GDP/capita growth accelerates in every single (global) baseline, which features 
successful mitigation (supplementary figure 5). While global baseline energy demand 
elasticity, thus, tends to follow historical elasticities, regions see more variation. The MAF 
region is the only region to absolutely decouple FE/capita from economic growth, which 
always accelerates, in every baseline (Figure 3a). Only few regional baselines (in Asia and 
the OECD) lower reference economic growth rates, with Asia moderating from fast historical 
rates and FE/capita growth rate change is negative more often (supplementary figure 5). In 
sum, all reference scenarios project near-term economic development highly successful by 
historical standards, with some regions also decoupling in the baseline.  
 
The above-historical GDP growth in baselines impose more stringent requirements on 
energy demand reduction for mitigation. Mitigation is assumed to leave economic growth 
rates virtually unchanged while energy demand plummets (Figure 3b). Deviations from 
baselines are an order of magnitude larger for final energy than GDP. This is independent of 
whether GDP is exogenous or endogenous in the IAM used (supplementary figure 6a). The 
MAF region exhibits the same flexibility for energy demand reductions as other regions, 
despite its much lower base level and in addition to the substantial savings already assumed 
in baseline scenarios. After 2040 growth in energy demand converges in mitigation and 
baseline scenarios. As decarbonisation advances and/or CDR measures come online, 
energy demand is a lesser constraint on emissions. The near-term break is less pronounced 
but qualitatively similar in scenarios limiting warming to below 2°C (supplementary figures 
5,6b). Broadly speaking, baseline assumptions ensure high income growth, while mitigation 
decouples energy demand. Mitigation scenarios depict (unprecedentedly) rapid development 
across the board while implying large gains in final to useful energy conversion efficiency. 
How can these patterns be motivated? 
 
Problems with regional absolute decoupling 
While models behind the scenarios discussed above vary in their details about future trends, 
they share the same theoretical approach to economy-energy modelling. Responses to 
carbon prices are assumed to be efficient, smooth, and in principle arbitrarily large. Except 
for differences in parameter values, high-, middle- and low-income economies are modelled 
the same way. Supplementary note 6 critically discusses economic growth theory in IAMs. 
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Yet, development economics tells a cautionary tale about assuming efficient growth without 
explaining how it is achieved. The simple idea of “getting the prices right”, by imposing high 
corrective carbon prices or equivalent policies, must contend with two centuries of economic 
history. Achieving sustained and fast economic growth from low levels has been far from the 
norm since the 1950s, and where it has been achieved it was universally by industrialisation. 
Industrial production requires higher commercial energy inputs per worker than either 
(subsistence) farming or services, and industrialisation has historically tended to imply 
growing, not falling, commercial energy intensity32–34. Yet, in order to realise the robust 
growth rates projected for the less affluent regions and the world as a whole, some form of 
industrialisation has to take place. Achieving this industrialisation is difficult. Simultaneously 
maximising energy conversion efficiency as emphasized in the scenarios above poses an 
unresolved policy challenge. 
 
In order to industrialize and adopt ‘frontier’ technology, developing countries have to import 
capital goods from rich country producers. This is true for any form of industrialization and 
even more so for the kind of energy-saving industrialisation envisioned by the IPCC 
scenarios. 
To do so, low-income countries face what are known as ‘two gap’ problems in development 
economics. The domestic lack of savings hinders investments (gap 1), and excessive trade 
deficits – e.g. from the need to import high efficiency capital goods – makes these 
investments even more expensive (gap 2)35. To get around this financing dilemma, less 
efficient but cheaper and possibly domestically produced machines could be installed. This 
would however ‘lock in’ the lower level of efficiency for the machines’ lifetimes36. Case 
studies of tapping vast energy efficiency potentials tend to describe situations where 
financing is not a constraint,37 and how quickly or whether efficiency improvements pay for 
themselves is context-dependent38. 
 
The capital constraint is accentuated when recognising the limited domestic resources 
available in most countries39. Incomes reported in purchasing power parity (PPP) inflate 
lower income countries’ resources to reflect relatively cheap domestic purchases. However, 
to the extent that energy efficient products must be purchased internationally, market 
exchange rates count. In 2018 middle and low income countries had only 42% the income in 
terms of US dollars at market exchange rates compared to PPP (USD4,967 vs. USD11,769 
per capita). Borrowing internationally and in foreign currency to finance these investments is 
risky and costly, as a predominance of international finance can have destabilising 
effects.40,41 Shrewd macroeconomic policy in developing countries could help with improving 
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economic conditions and enabling the financing. It must also stabilise economies that are 
disrupted by high carbon prices. 
 
Abrupt and unanticipated changes in prices (energy or otherwise) have caused recessions 
with high unemployment through upending the original production structure based on a 
different set of prices. The aftermath of the 1978-79 oil crisis is one example of this; it also 
helped cause debt defaults in Latin American countries when their foreign debts 
denominated in dollars became more expensive in the wake of the US’ hike in interest rates 
(Volcker shock) to deal with US price changes. Additionally, disruptions from price-focussed 
climate policy could cause asset stranding, default on debts, and a destabilisation of the 
financial system via these ‘transition risks’, another area that needs a macroeconomic policy 
response42. IAMs, originally designed for long-term analysis, assume smooth paths of 
adjustment with any price combination and lack a proper depiction of governments. Yet, as 
the short-term assumes crucial importance for ambitious mitigation, the question of how 
financing and macroeconomic stability in developing countries constrains model pathways 
requires scrutiny43,44. 
 
Research Directions 
Economists have historically tended to be more bullish than other disciplines about the 
economy’s ability to overcome resource constraints via substitution45,46. Yet, the smooth 
substitution in developing countries of vastly more energy efficient technologies over the 
next couple of decades alongside successful development implied by current climate policy 
scenarios in IAMs is challenging also by these standards. None of this even addresses 
rebound effects, which are poorly understood at the macroeconomic level but could be 
substantial,47 additional consumption at the extensive margin, such as first-time purchase of 
white goods,48 or increased air-conditioning in a warming climate49. Historical evidence and 
development economics strongly suggest saving energy cannot play the role it is currently 
assigned in scenarios. 
 
IAMs were designed to produce consistent long-run projections of the climate and the 
economy. With climate change accelerating and policy lagging behind, model scenarios 
push to the limits of feasibility in multiple domains to achieve stringent mitigation targets. 
Hence, such scenarios have to be interpreted as conditional explorations. However, we 
argue that various IAM scenarios ignore important institutional constraints, which we believe 
to be binding due to historical evidence. Since IAMs cannot test their results against data 
that is not yet generated, they must convince with strong explanatory power that their 
pathways are plausible31,50. Our analysis of the development of energy demand alongside 
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robust economic growth across regions suggests that the details of near-term “development 
without energy” need to be better understood for making plausible assumptions.51  
 
Key details would involve clarifying developing country growth strategies (particularly 
industrialisation) and their energy implications, as well as problems of financing and 
stabilization in the short-term. Taking industrialisation as a growth strategy seriously may 
challenge some of the assumptions about low energy growth as we argued here. But more 
attention to explicit modelling of investment and its financing may loosen other constraints. 
While daunting challenges also exist in decarbonising developing countries’ energy mix,39  
robust investment-price decline relationships could highlight opportunities for faster energy 
supply decarbonisation52, where IAMs have been shown to depict slow rates of change 
relative to historical figures53–55.  
 
First attempts to quantify global investments within IAMs44 and independent studies40,56,57 are 
promising, and financing and risks to stability are also starting to be considered58. Research 
on the political feasibility of such investments and potential trade-offs between different 
mitigation policies has not yet produced robust evidence, but suggests that barriers may 
exist59,60. With their rapid break from past patterns of growth in economic output and energy 
inputs, the scenarios show just how difficult the challenge for a concerted policy effort is to 
simultaneously sustain economic growth, redirect investments towards low-carbon 
alternatives, improve policy cooperation and prevent rebound effects with price policies that 
must nonetheless not be regressive. Detailing the process by which this happens would 
make them even more helpful tools in the design and analysis of climate change mitigation. 
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Figure 1 | Historical output and energy per capita relation: (a) Output per capita in 2011 
kiloUSD at purchasing power parity (PPP) and primary energy per capita in kilowatt for 186 
countries 1950-2014 (unbalanced). Direct equivalent primary energy includes non-
commercial sources but excludes muscle power. (b) Global annual and average growth 
rates during three historical periods. (c) Rate of energy flow in high income and other 
countries, 1950-2014. Sources: see Methods. 
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Figure 2 | Projections of output and final energy per capita relation until 2050: (a) 
Global income per capita and final energy per capita projections of 1.5°C scenarios to 2050 
in grey. Archetype scenarios are in blue. Scenario values have been normalised to start at 
the same historical level in 2010. Markers indicate decades. Black is the historical trajectory 
and the red lines extrapolate 1950-73 (Gold), 1973-2000 (Slow) and 2000-18 (Millennium) 
growth rates. The Gold extrapolation is truncated after 2030 to avoid extending the y-axis. 
(b) Same as (a) but for Middle East & Africa region. Sources: see methods. 
 
 
 
Figure 3 | Reference and policy scenario growth rate deviations from historical rates: 
(a) Growth rate deviation in percentage points in scenarios in 2020-30 relative to the 1970-
2015 historical average for the World and Middle East & Africa in baselines (BAU) and 
successive mitigation scenarios, 2°C and 1.5°C of the four SSP ‘archetype’ scenarios. 
GDP/capita deviation is on the x-axis, FE/capita is on the y-axis. (b) Deviations in 
percentage points from baseline (BAU) growth rates in all scenarios mitigating to 1.5°C in 
various periods for the World and Middle East & Africa. Boxes encompass the interquartile 
range and have no whiskers. The horizontal line in the box shows the median scenario. 
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